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INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate goal of humanitarian relief logistics is to deliver the right supplies in the 
right quantities to the right locations at the right time, so save lives and reduce human 
suffering within given financial constraints (Beamon and Balcik, 2008). Pre-positioned 
warehouses at strategic locations are essential for this purpose to ensure the availability 
of supplies when required and to facilitate faster responses (Balcik et al., 2010). It has 
been suggested that, in the long run, such an approach leads to the reduction of delivery 
costs by regular replenishment using inexpensive maritime transport (Gatignon et al., 
2010). However, pre-positioned warehouses might be difficult to operate by some NGOs 
because it is both complicated and expensive given the limitations in finance and 
resources (Balcik and Beamon, 2008). Indeed, pre-positioned warehouses for 
humanitarian relief create various types of risks, but they haven’t been fully explored 
yet.  
In this respect, this study aims to investigate the challenges in humanitarian relief 
operations relating to pre-positioned warehouses. In specific, it focuses on the 
interactions between various risk factors within the humanitarian logistics management 
in order to understand how those challenges are generated and enhanced. For this 
purpose, this study explores the main risk factors of pre-positioned humanitarian 
distribution centres by interviews with practitioners in the humanitarian aid 
organisations. Based on the risk factors identified in the interviews, the interacting 
relationships between risk factors are mapped with the aid of the directed graph created 
by Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM). As a consequence, the results of ISM will help 
to understand the different levels of risk and the root causes of risk amplification in 
humanitarian relief logistics. Compared with the studies on commercial distribution 
centres, less research has been conducted for humanitarian logistics distribution centres. 
To this end, this research will provide a comparatively novel and meaningful work in 
humanitarian relief logistics. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Humanitarian relief logistics is defined as the process of planning, implementing and 
controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as 
related information, from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose 
of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Indeed, 
logistics serves as a bridge between disaster preparedness and response (Thomas, 
2003); therefore, humanitarian logistics is crucial to the effectiveness and speed of 
response for major humanitarian programs. 
The comparison between the commercial and humanitarian supply chain has been 
studied by a large body of researchers from a number of different perspectives. 
Humanitarian logistics, as well as business logistics, encompasses a range of activities, 
including: preparedness, planning, design, procurement, transportation, inventory, 
warehousing, tracking and tracing, distribution, recipient satisfaction bidding and reverse 
bidding, reporting and accountability, and customs clearance (Gustavsson, 2003; Thomas 
and Kopczak, 2005). The basic principles of managing the flow of goods, information and 
finances that have been established by commercial logistics are also valid for 
humanitarian logistics (Kovacs and Spens, 2007). The unique characteristics of the 
disaster relief environment, and a comparison and contrast between the commercial and 
humanitarian relief supply chains have been described by Beamon (2004), Thomas and 
Kopczak (2005) and Van Wassenhove (2006). 
Humanitarian logistics is characterised by large-scale activities, irregular demand and 
unusual constraints (Beamon and Kotleba, 2006). The problems can range from a lack of 
electricity supplies to limited transport infrastructure including ‘controlled’ environment 
with some minor variability (e.g. traffic congestion) (Kovacs and Spens, 2009). 
Commercial logistics are normally planned in advance of demand and relatively well 
established while relief logistical decisions are made within shorter time frames (Balcik 
and Beamon, 2008). They usually deal with a predetermined set of suppliers, 
manufacturing sites, and a stable or at least predictable demand, which are all unknown 
in humanitarian logistics (Cassidy, 2003). Many businesses are driven by customers (i.e. 
demand) in commercial logistics, while humanitarian organisations are mostly driven by 
donors (i.e. supply) (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). The customers (aid 
recipients) actually have no choice and, therefore, ‘true demand’ is not created in 
humanitarian logistics (Kovacs and Spens, 2009). 
In the initial days of the deployment phase, most of the critical supplies arriving to the 
disaster are sourced from an organisation’s global pre-positioned stocks (Balcik and 
Beamon, 2008). Cost is one of the reasons for pre-purchasing the supplies as they are 
able to purchase them at a reasonable price (Salisbury, 2007). Once disaster occurs, 
demand increases dramatically and suppliers will often raise their prices in response. 
Relief organisations adapt the in-advance purchase strategy and store in the pre-
positioned warehouse to react quickly (Beamon and Balcik, 2008). There are several 
challenges that relief organization faces in order to ensure the smooth flow of the relief 
logistics. Difficulty in creating an effective pre-positioning plan includes uncertainty about 
whether or not natural disasters will occur and, if they do, where and with what 
magnitude (Rawls and Turnquist, 2010). Consequently, operating a pre-positioned 
warehouse could be financially prohibitive and there are only a handful of relief 
organisations who can support the expense of operating distribution centres (Balcik and 
Beamon, 2008; Salisbury, 2007). 
Although pre-positioned stocks may be useful, they may be restricted as they require 
considerable financial investment (Chaikan, 2003). For this reason, some of the NGOs 
tend to focus on operational disaster relief activities rather than disaster preparedness 
(Thomas, 2007). Balcik and Beamon (2008) insist that some NGOs avoid using a pre-
positioning strategy because it is both complicated and expensive. They also indicate that 
the total volume of demand satisfied from the pre-positioned inventory is generally much 
less than the total volume of supplies sent to the disaster region over the entire relief 
horizon. Salisbury (2007) argues that internal transport capacity is one of the most 
limited resources in determining the capacity where third-party logistics contractors (i.e. 
3rd Party Logistics) need to be involved. 
For large-scale quick-onset disasters, it is impossible to meet the entire emergency 
demand solely from pre-positioned stocks (Balcik and Beamon, 2008). The difficulty to 
initiate or to maintain the pre-positioned warehouse strategy are due to the uncertainty 
of disaster occurrences, funding tendencies in the sector and the costs associated with 
operating distribution centres (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Balcik and Beamon, 2008; 
Balcik et al. 2010). The warehouse would be useless if it is easily exposed to frequent 
disaster occurred area. Rawls and Turnquist (2006) and Ukkusuri and Yushimoto (2008) 
modelled the pre-positioned warehouse considering the facility not being 
destroyed/damaged by the disasters. The national stability of the country would provide 
predictable policy management for an organization to manage (Kayikci, 2010). 
The literatures have discussed the limitations and the restrictions of the prepositioned 
warehouse strategy in humanitarian logistics. However, the discussions on the attributes 
are scarce and do not analyse how they influence each other. These led the authors to 
conduct a series of interviews with practitioners to identify the risk elements that affect 
the pre-positioned warehouse and to develop a structural model of those elements to 
understand the ultimate challenges in humanitarian relief logistics. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This research aims to investigate the challenges in humanitarian logistics of pre-
positioned warehouses, which is addressed by multi-phase mixed methods combining 
semi-structured interviews and interpretive structural modelling (ISM). The risk factors 
found in the interviews will become the basic elements of ISM, leading to an ample 
structure to demonstrate the characteristics of the challenges. 
 
Phase 1: Semi-structured interviews 
Since the empirical studies on the risks and vulnerabilities within humanitarian logistics 
are scarce in the literature, semi-structured interview was conducted as an exploratory 
research method with supply chain managers and officers in humanitarian aid 
organisations. The qualitative interview is more flexible and conversational than 
quantitative methods in that it allows new questions to be brought up as a result of the 
interviewee’s response during the interview. The objective of the interviews was to better 
understand the application of the pre-positioning strategy for the humanitarian 
organisation broadly and to identify the unforeseen issues and opinions of operating or 
planning the pre-positioning warehouse strategy for humanitarian relief logistics. 
Face-to-face and telephone interviews were administered, from February to April 2012, 
with 25 personnel at the managerial or higher level in their organisations. Electronic mail 
and video calls were made to confirm the factors that were identified and the 
respondents were asked to give their opinions on the risk factors of their warehouse 
strategy. The objectives of the interviews are to better understand the application of the 
pre-positioning strategy for the humanitarian organisation broadly and to identify the 
unforeseen issues and opinions of operating or planning the pre-positioning warehouse 
strategy for humanitarian relief logistics.  
 
Phase 2: Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) 
The risk elements found in the interviews will be analysed by ISM, an analytic framework 
to encapsulate the relationships of specific elements in a complex system (Vivek et al., 
2008). ISM offers an insightful development of collective understandings of those 
relations so that complex interconnections of risk events can be portrayed within a model 
(Faisal et al. 2007). In this respect, ISM can be seen as the most appropriate method to 
describe the challenges in humanitarian logistics by creating a holistic risk structure with 
risks and their interactions. ISM is a step-wise process comprising of seven steps to 
reach a final model (Faisal et al. 2007; Pfohl et al., 2011) as outline below. The elements 
for Step 1 were initiated by semi-structured interviews, and then the contextual 
relationships for Step 2 were decided by a series of panel discussions of 10 humanitarian 
experts.  
(1) Identification of elements: The elements that constitute the challenges in pre-
positioned warehousing are identified and operationalized by semi-structured interviews. 
Each element will be labelled by a number for the analysis.  
(2)Contextual relationships: The contextual relationships between the elements are 
determined by the opinions of 10 humanitarian logistics experts. They are captured by 
statements using  
(3) Structural Self-Interaction Matrix (SSIM): A SSIM can be generated by substituting 
contextual relationships of each pair with legends like V, A, X and O for each (i, j) entry. 
V will be used when element i leads to element j, whilst A will be used when i is led by j. 
If there is no relationship or a mutual relationship between i and j, X and O will be 
assigned respectively.  
(4) Reachability Matrix: A reachability matrix will convert each (i, j) entry of the SSIM 
into number 0 and 1. When element i directly or indirectly leads to element j, number 1 
will be put into (i, j) entry. If i doesn’t lead to j at all, 0 will be assigned to the entry.  
(5) Level Partitioning: Given the reachability matrix, the reachability set (RS), antecedent 
set (AS) and intersection set (IS=RS∩AS) of each element will be generated. The 
elements whose RS is the same as IS will be set aside as the top level. New RS, AS and 
IS of each element will be sought without these elements, and then  
(6) Digraph: A directed graph or digraph can be drawn using the reachability matrix and 
partitioned levels. The elements can be laid vertically and horizontally according to the 
levels, and then connected by arrows based on the numbers in reachability matrix.  
(7) ISM-based Model: The final ISM-based model can be generated by substituting the 
numbers in the diagraph with the original titles of the elements.  
 
FINDINGS 
A series of interviews with 25 experts revealed that various risks are intertwined to 
generate great challenges in operating pre-positioned warehouses. There were 17 risk 
elements that were most commonly mentioned by the interviewees.  
(1) High Asset Maintenance Cost: This cost includes the storage, transportation, labour 
and any other costs that relate to operating the warehouse system. Due to these 
difficulties, small relief organisations with financial burdens could not dare to operate the 
pre-positioning warehouse system. 
(2) High Inventory Cost: This cost includes those related to storing and maintaining 
inventory over a certain period of time. As the demand in humanitarian relief operation is 
uncertain, there always lies a high chance of the relief items to be hold for long time 
which will influence the cost. 
(3) Uncertain Demand: Most of the demand in humanitarian relief operations is 
unpredictable which leads to uncertain demands. Due to this, humanitarian organisations 
have difficulties identifying the beneficiaries and the relief items. 
(4) Failure in Forecasting Stock Level: Humanitarian relief organisations normally do not 
have the system to forecast the stock level as they are reluctant to invest the cost. Due 
to this, most of the small and medium size organisations forecast stock level manually 
which often mislead to predict.   
(5) Lack of Confidence in What to Stock: Some humanitarian organisations standardised 
the basic relief items to stock in their warehouse. These standardised items were 
organised through lots of years of experience. However, most other organisations prefer 
to purchase and deliver at the disaster occurrence country or neighbouring countries. The 
main reason for this is not only to save cost and reduce time but also not confident of 
what to stock. 
(6) High Transport Cost: Relief items are sent to pre-positioned warehouse via sea 
transport which would take several weeks and save transportation cost. However, the 
relief items are sent to the disaster occurred area via air transport from the pre-
positioned warehouse. Eventually, pre-positioned warehouse strategy would increase the 
delivery cost due to the air transport. 
(7) Difficulties in Justifying Funding: People who donate financially want to know whether 
their aid is properly used. They prefer to see the relief items are purchased and delivered 
to the people in need instead of supporting the operation cost, especially in maintaining 
the warehouse. Donors are often not aware of that their contribution also support the 
whole relief chain processes, rather think that the donations are used only to purchase 
relief items. Donors are reluctant to support the organisation if the money is used for the 
whole relief supply chain. Relief organisations experience the difficulties explaining to 
them of the importance of operating pre-positioned warehouse strategy. 
(8) Limited Space: The space available in the warehouse is limited to store relief items 
for some humanitarian organisations. Some organisations do not have proper 
warehouses and store the relief items somewhere else such as in the basement of the 
building or garage. Even those who own their warehouse facility, they always look for a 
spacious warehouse to hold more relief items. 
(9) Infrastructure: The quality of the infrastructure for pre-positioned warehouse would 
be a concern for humanitarian organisations as some of the potential warehouses are 
located in the underdeveloped countries or near the disaster prone areas. This area tends 
to have low quality of infrastructure. 
(10) Stock Out: Humanitarian organisations try to stock relief items as much as possible 
to support the people in need when immediate disaster occurs as the casualty is massive. 
Even though they stock try to stock maximum level not to be short of relief items, the 
aid they need to support are always high in numbers which are more than the stocked 
items. For this, humanitarian organisations are always concern with the stock out 
situation. 
(11) IT Breakdown: IT is a crucial source for communication within the organisation 
especially when disaster occurs. The accurate information of number of relief items, kinds 
of relief items, destinations, types of transport, etc. are important to reduce time and 
cost for efficient relief operations. Humanitarian organisations prefer their pre-positioned 
warehouse to be located in a country with acceptable IT equipment as some of them are 
located in vulnerable countries with poor IT quality. 
(12) Dependency on Logistics Service Providers (LSPs): Some major humanitarian 
organisations outsource the logistics operation to logistics service providers as most of 
them do not have the expertise skills and know-how relate to this matter. Everything 
should be stand-by mode to deliver the relief items within 48-72 hours to the disaster 
occurred location. Dependency arises from these highly-demanding requests from the 
humanitarian organisations with no logistics expertise. 
(13) Poor Quality of Goods: The deterioration of the relief items are influenced by many 
factors including the nature of the bad quality of the relief goods itself or the climate and 
the environment of the site. A very hot climate not only affects the relief items but also 
the labour force in the warehouse. 
(14) Poor Performance of LSPs: As some of the humanitarian outsource their logistics 
operation to logistics service providers, it sometimes matter who LSP make contract with. 
Small mistakes or delay would influence the delivery time. 
(15) Local Staff Quality: The low performance of locally-hired staff would be caused by 
miscommunication, cultural differences, different working condition, etc. However it is 
considered important for managerial level logisticians to be competent in logistical skills 
and knowledge. Even though they would be deployed from the humanitarian organisation 
in many cases, they still have to work with qualified local staff for efficient management.    
(16) Natural Disasters: Some humanitarian organisations tend to locate their pre-
positioned warehouse close to the disaster vulnerable countries to reduce cost and time. 
However, some are aware that being close to those areas would put the warehouse in 
danger due to the natural disasters. To avoid the warehouse destroyed by the natural 
disasters, some humanitarian organisations rather prefer to locate the warehouse that 
would receive less influence of them. 
(17) Social Instability: Social stability of the country is important to prevent any 
unexpected theft or pilferage. Some of the relief items stocked in the warehouse are very 
valuation items; for example, radio-telecommunication systems, medicines, armoured 
vehicles, food, etc. Security of the location is concerned to be important in pre-positioned 
warehouse strategy. 
Given these 17 risk elements, interpretive structural modelling was conducted according 
to the 7 steps aforementioned. As a result, the final ISM-based model can be drawn as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. ISM-based model 
 
DISCUSSION 
From the ISM-based model, it was identified that the challenges in operating pre-
positioned warehouse operations consist of three levels of risk elements: (1) threats to 
values in humanitarian logistics management, (2) disturbances in logistics activities and 
(3) disruptions by external factors. The interactions between these levels show one-way 
direction, where Level 3 leads to Level 2, which in turn, leads to Level 1.  
Level 1 consists of the risks which are relating to values, cost and quality, that 
humanitarian logistics pursues. As being the risk consequences, they are dependent upon 
other risks. Among them, difficulties in justifying funding places at the top, which means 
that organisations feel the pressure from donors once pre-positioned warehouses are 
malfunctioned. One difference from commercial logistics is that delay or time loss is not 
captured within this level, which will be partly because pre-positioned warehouses clearly 
aim to reduce the lead time.  
The risks in Level 2, on the other hand, are mainly initiated by logistics activities and 
operations, which encompass forecasting, transport, warehousing and outsourcing. The 
ISM-based model demonstrates that there are three feedback loops which enhance the 
level of challenges within level 2, as can be seen in Figure 2. Interesting enough, all 
these feedback loops were generated around high transport cost. The reason can be 
attributed to the fact that reduction of transport cost is one of the main purposes to 
operate pre-positioned warehouses. With the warehouses, the majority of relief items can 
be transported via sea leg whose cost is cheaper than any other transport modes given 
the high volume of items. However, failure in logistics activities directly and indirectly 
affects the transport cost by adding transport frequencies and/or by using more 
expensive transport options.  
For example, dependency on LSPs based on limited knowledge on logistics often leads to 
opportunistic behaviours of LSPs, which result in poor logistics performance. Additional 
transport cost will be required to rectify this issue, which in turn undermines the 
bargaining power of humanitarian organisations under budget constraints in the 
relationships with LSPs (feedback loop 1). In order to eliminate this risk circle, some 
NGOs pursue tighter partnerships with competent LSPs. Other two feedback loops are 
closely related to the humanitarian organisations’ capability to control the logistics 
process. The incapability of forecasting the accurate stock level will result in additional 
transport cost for ‘hot delivery’ of relief items, which increases the level of their reliance 
on LSPs. As the organisations lose their control over logistics process, the accurate 
forecasting is getting difficult (feedback loop 2). In the same vein, lack of confidence in 
selecting items to be stored can lead to forecasting failure and to high transport cost. The 
budget constraints emanating from high transport cost cause jeopardy in the item 
selection process (feedback loop 3). In the interviews, humanitarian organisations find it 
difficult to make an accurate forecasting due to their incapability in logistics operations as 
well as the unpredictability of events requiring humanitarian relief.   
Last but not least, the Level 3 risks are external to humanitarian organisations, but have 
significant influences on Level 1 and Level 2 risks. This level of risks is also frequently 
mentioned in the supply chain risk management literature as environmental risks. 
However, the difference is Level 3 risks can be considered both as risks to logistics 
operations and as the events where humanitarian relief is required.  
 
 
Figure 2. Three self-enhancing loops in the model 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research empirically identified various risks in operating pre-positioned warehouses 
for humanitarian logistics and created a structure of risk interactions in order to 
understand how the risks are generated and enhanced. As a result, 17 risk factors, 3 
distinctive risk levels as well as 3 self-enhancing risk loops were discussed in this 
research. This is a first study which investigated the risks in humanitarian logistics using 
a structural model, which can be a ground for future research about humanitarian 
logistics risk management. In addition, the risk profile can provide a checklist for 
humanitarian logistics practitioners to assess the level of risks in their operations. Given 
the levels and feedback loops of risk factors, they can also find out which risk factor 
should be intensively mitigated to reduce the risk level. This study confined its scope of 
research to the risks stemming from operations of pre-positioned warehouses. Future 
research can expand the research scope to the entire process of humanitarian relief 
logistics. 
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